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REGULATING AFTER THE FACT
Samuel Issacharoff*
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, as the last vestiges of the Soviet empire were passing from
the world scene, Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw presented an
early balance sheet of the postwar lessons on government regulation
of the economy. Their work, The Commanding Heights, chronicles
the turn from command-and-control models of regulation to more
subtle market mechanisms that leave more to the worlds of innovation
and entrepreneurship, including the full-scale dismantling of state-run
enterprises and their sale or license to private firms.1
One of the highlights of Yergin and Stanislaw's analysis involved
the question of market entry. Highly regulated societies typically re-
quire advance administrative approval for all sorts of market initia-
tives, whether the opening of new businesses or the introduction of
new products to the consuming public.2 By contrast, one of the cen-
tral features of the deregulatory impulses of the late twentieth century
was the liberalization of market access for goods and services without
anticipatory governmental approval. 3 The ability to open a business
provides a case in point. Prior to Putin-era reforms, for example, a
typical business in Russia needed to acquire between 300 and 500 dif-
ferent permits before opening.4 By 2001, that number had dimin-
ished considerably, but it was still a formidable seventy.5
The turn in The Commanding Heights to the problems of market
entry built on the considerable foundations laid by Hernando de Soto.
In his remarkable account of barriers to economic participation in
* Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. I benefited
from the comments of Richard Nagareda, Catherine Sharkey, and John Witt on earlier versions.
Elizabeth Madjlessi and Ian Samuel provided indispensable research assistance for this Article.
1. DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR
THE WORLD ECONOMY 329, 417 (2002).
2. The Soviet Union is, of course, the textbook example of a highly regulated market. See
PAUL R. GREGORY & ROBERT C. STUART, SOVIET ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
(3d ed. 1986). In the USSR, Gosplan, the State Planning Committee, coordinated virtually all
economic activity.
3. YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 1, at 417.
4. Id. at 305-06.
5. Id.
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Peru, de Soto chronicled the suffocating effects of regulation-its at-
tendant costs and time consumed, as well as its seemingly inescapable
accompaniment by corruption and further bureaucratic delay. 6 As de
Soto subsequently developed, the inability to enter the marketplace
was part of a more systematic exclusion of the world's poor, prevent-
ing them from translating their holdings-even if relatively meager-
and their capacity to work into legally recognized and legally pro-
tected capital.7 For de Soto, suffocating bureaucracy and stagnant le-
gal systems deprive the working poor in nonadvanced societies of the
potential benefits of what he describes as "trillions of dollars in dead
capital."8
More recently, a systematic study of entry barriers forcefully estab-
lished a distinct overlap between the wealth of countries and the ease
of entry into their marketplaces. 9 The conclusion is presented starkly:
An analysis of the regulation of entry in 85 countries shows that,
even aside from the costs associated with corruption and bureau-
cratic delay, business entry is extremely expensive, especially in the
countries outside the top quartile of the income distribution. We
find that heavier regulation of entry is generally associated with
greater corruption and a larger unofficial economy, but not with
better quality of private or public goods. We also find that the
countries with less limited, less democratic, and more intervention-
ist governments regulate entry more heavily, even controlling for
the level of economic development. 10
As summarized by another study taking a similar tack, "[o]nce a
developing country's government establishes fair rules of the game
and ensures their enforcement, that government is well advised to in-
terfere minimally with privately generated growth.""1 No doubt, the
political costs of deregulation are high, particularly for parts of the
economy (e.g., agriculture in developed countries) that depend heav-
ily upon government subsidies. The disruptive pressures of globaliza-
tion are real, but so is the breadth of an international market. There
are, of course, pockets of resistance, as seen last year when French
students took to the streets to beat back a government proposal that
would have allowed a two-year "testing" period in which employers
6. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC ANSWER TO TERRORISM (1989).
7. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRI-
UMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
8. Id. at 210.
9. Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. EcoN. 1 (2002).
10. Id. at 35.
11. Richard Roll & John R. Talbott, Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and Prosperity, 14
J. DEMOCRACY 75, 76-77 (2003).
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could freely hire and fire undesired employees.' 2 Yet despite the inev-
itable protests from the immediate beneficiaries of particular govern-
ment regulations, the argument in favor of deregulation appears
inescapable.
In all these exchanges over the benefits of a liberalized economic
order, the United States is invariably Exhibit A. No country seems to
realize the benefits of wide open markets, of relaxed entry into the
world of commerce, and of economic dynamism as fully as the United
States. No country seems to have an economy so freely operating-
indeed, so unregulated-as does the United States.
Or so it would seem. This Article takes mild issue with the implicit
view of the United States found in many of these studies. What distin-
guishes the United States is not that it is an unregulated market-far
from it. What is distinctive about the United States is the extent to
which we regulate not entry but consequences. There is a significant
difference between an unregulated market and a deregulated market
featuring low entry costs but careful scrutiny after the fact. What re-
ally sets the United States apart is the fact that its basic regulatory
model is ex post rather than ex ante, a form of regulation that draws
heavily on its common-law tradition.1 3 It is precisely the availability
of meaningful ex post accountability that comes to define much of the
operation of the rule of law in the United States.
14
In this Article, I want to make three brief points about the central-
ity of ex post regulation at the deepest levels of the American concep-
tion of the rule of law. First, I want to contrast two regulatory models
employed in this country, regulation under the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) and under the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), to highlight the difference between ex post and ex ante
regulation. Second, I will look more closely at the SEC model to show
12. See David R. Howell & John Schmitt, Vive Les Jeunes, AM. PROSPECT, June 2006, at 16.
13. For a somewhat critical account of this state of affairs that focuses attention on ex post
versus ex ante regulatory interventions, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 16 (2001). Professor Kagan makes clear that "[i]t is only a slight over-
simplification to say that in the United States lawyers, legal rights, judges, and lawsuits are the
functional equivalent of the large central bureaucracies that dominate governance in high-tax,
activist welfare states." Id.
14. There is a long literature on the trade-offs between the certainty of ex ante regulations
and the greater flexibility and market-responsiveness of ex post liability rules. See Donald Witt-
man, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring,
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977); see also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). More recently, efforts have been made to develop formal
models of the trade-offs between the two. See Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability for
Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 888
(1990) (using this approach to model regulation of potential environmental harm and proposing
as optimal a mix of ex ante regulation and ex post liability).
2007]
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just how critical private enforcement is to ex post regulation. Finally,
I will conclude with a concern about the general tenor of tort reform
and other initiatives whose effect, when examined en masse, is to cir-
cumscribe the availability of ex post accountability as a necessary
complement to the liberalized ex ante economic environment in the
United States. This final point ties into the central question of this
Symposium: "Is the Rule of Law Waning in America?"
II. COMING TO MARKET
The FDA is the federal agency that most closely resembles the pre-
vailing model of permit-based market entry prevalent in much of Eu-
rope and-in less elegant fashion-the rest of the world. Even in the
Lochner era, regulation of potentially contaminated foodstuffs was a
recognized and protected part of the police power of the state.' 5 The
exceptional regulatory reach of the FDA is premised on the notion
that market-based solutions, such as loss of reputation, are insufficient
in the context of contaminants that carry the potential to do vast harm
to the consuming population.16 The FDA minimizes the potential
harm of new pharmaceuticals by requiring manufacturers of drugs to
conduct specific tests before the FDA will license them for sale, and
by exposing these manufacturers to strict liability.' 7 The FDA itself
conducts extensive prerelease testing of drugs and monitors their
health impact after they are authorized for sale. FDA regulations
cover the waterfront of the pharmaceutical market, including preap-
proval testing, drug manufacturing, labeling, advertising, and postap-
proval monitoring for adverse drug reactions.1 8
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 197619 also
provides an interesting partial exception to the general rule of ex post
review, though milder than the ex ante review required to bring new
drugs onto the market. Under this Act, certain parties are required to
notify the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) before merging to ensure
that no antitrust concerns are triggered by the merger.20 If the merger
15. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (contemplating the validity of legis-
lation designed to provide "[c]lean and wholesome bread," though concluding that a maximum
hours regulation does not do so).
16. See generally Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Adminis-
trative State, 1 J. TORT L. (2006), http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/issl/art4 (detailing FDA pre-
emption of ex post remedies and rationales in the context of premarket approval).
17. See Kolstad et al., supra note 14, at 889.
18. Gregory C. Jackson, Comment, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to
Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 199, 210
(1992).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
20. Id. § 18a(a)(2).
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would create a certain level of economic concentration in the mar-
ket,21 the parties must notify the FTC and wait before closing the
deal.22 The presumption is that the potential market disruption result-
ing from such mergers requires the unusual step of ex ante review.
But even here, the regulations require only a waiting period; if the
FTC does not respond after a certain period of time, the parties may
proceed.
At the other end of the spectrum, we find the SEC, an agency that
compels standard forms of disclosure and general corporate organiza-
tion, but does little to regulate actual business transactions in the
highly fluid and volatile securities market.23 Issuing an offering, or
engaging in other forms of securities transactions, is completely unlike
bringing a new drug onto the market. There are no laborious testing
processes for securities, and there is no federal licensing required
before they may issue. Rather, the only question is whether the SEC's
reliance on ex post enforcement has justified the charge that it lacks
"meaningful, orderly, and fair regulatory processes. ' 24 The SEC takes
advantage of its ability to regulate conduct ex post out of a concern
that promulgating specific regulations may result in underinclusive
standards that are "susceptible of easy evasion." 25 Because of the
technical issues and rapidly changing substantive context, there are
significant administrative benefits to the SEC's approach, 26 including
the ability to enlist the private bar as a key participant in enforcing
laws against securities fraud.27 Former SEC Commissioner Harvey
Goldschmid emphasized this point: "Private enforcement is a neces-
sary supplement to the work that the [SEC] does. It is also a safety
valve against the potential capture of the agency by industry. '28
The ex post regulatory model is premised on the idea that parties
should be able to internalize the risk of liability-perhaps even for
21. Id.
22. Id. § l8a(d)-(e).
23. See KENNETH B. WINER & SAMUEL J. WINER, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT: COUNSELING
AND DEFENSE § 4.01 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that recent years have seen only a few hundred inves-
tigations annually, and those few that are done tend to be focused on "financial fraud and ac-
counting," "insider trading," "offerings," and "regulated entities (e.g., broker-dealers,
investment advisors)"-in other words, ex post enforcement of disclosure, fraud, and conflict of
interest laws).
24. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement. A Look Ahead
at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 156 (1990).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 182.




punitive damages-and regulate themselves accordingly. The exten-
sive literature on the deterrent function of ex post remedies need not
be discussed here. 29 The simple point is that ex post remedies require
two forms of access: access to the relevant information to establish
liability after the fact, and access to an effective enforcement tribunal.
Whereas ex ante government regulation sets standards for regulated
economic actors to meet, ex post regulation uses the threat of liability
to force an internalization of potential damage payments and allows
parties to calibrate their anticipatory remedial measures.30 The key is
that both ex ante and ex post review are essential parts of the regula-
tory model-sometimes operating in tandem, sometimes as substi-
tutes. As Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman explains, relative to after-
the-fact enforcement methods, anticipatory statutory regulation
utilizes government officials "to decide individual cases instead of
judges and juries; resolves some generic issues in rulemakings not
linked to individual cases; uses nonjudicialized procedures to evaluate
technocratic information; affects behavior ex ante without waiting for
harm to occur, and minimizes the inconsistent and unequal coverage
arising from individual adjudication."'3 1 Most countries use some mix
of ex post and ex ante regulation to control undesirable market con-
duct. What is not found in developed countries is a complete absence
of regulation-a system with neither ex ante entry barriers nor means
of enforcing ex post accountability.
III. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE Ex POST WORLD
The SEC provides a perfect example of how enforcement is accom-
plished even in deregulated markets. Enforcement, if needed, will oc-
cur only after allegations of wrongdoing surface. Further, there is no
assumption that the SEC itself will be the primary enforcement agent.
A recent study by Professor Howell Jackson finds that in the two-year
period from 2000 to 2002, private class actions were responsible for
twice the recovery for victims of alleged securities fraud as actions
29. For foundational works on deterrence in the law, see generally JEREMY BENTHAM, Ratio-
nale of Punishment, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 388 (John Bowring ed., Simpkin,
Marshall & Co., London 1843) (1830); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th
ed. 2003); Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000), http://encyclo.findlaw.com.
30. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Govern-
ment Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 82 (1989).
31. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 54
(1991).
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brought by the SEC and the Department of Justice. 32 There is little
dispute about the centrality of private actions in enforcing the com-
plex web of securities law. Indeed, the most sophisticated critical as-
sessments of securities laws turn not on the lack of public
enforcement, but on the insufficiency of private enforcement to deter
misconduct as a result of complicated incentive structures that make it
easier to collect from the firm itself or its insurers than it is to collect
from corporate malefactors. 33
Private enforcement is not a necessary feature of a system of ex
post review. One could easily imagine a system of liberalized market
entry that is followed by stringent public enforcement of norms of ac-
countability. Under such a system, the SEC could be the exclusive
enforcement agency and private rights of action could be eliminated.
We reserve the enforcement of the criminal code to public agencies
and there is no theoretical reason why the enforcement of civil law-
particularly in regulated walks of life-could not also be reserved to
public agencies. But this would require public agencies to assume
markedly different functions than they now have. It is almost incon-
ceivable that the SEC, with its allocation of less than a billion dollars a
year,34 would be able to perform its current functions and serve as an
investigator and prosecutor of securities fraud.
Whatever the potential merits of restricting enforcement to public
entities, what is clear is that this is decidedly not the system that we
have. But beyond the positive account of what we have, there are
strong arguments that can be made for decentralized enforcement in
which government does not stake out the entire enforcement terrain,
either ex ante or ex post. Professor Richard Stewart captured the role
of a privately initiated claim for redress: "It frees individuals from
total dependence on collective bureaucratic remedies and gives them
a personal role and stake in the administration of justice. It provides a
back-up guarantee of redress. In a society such as ours, these are im-
portant virtues. ' '35 Thus, although it is possible to imagine a better
funded public enforcement agency that assumes complete ex post en-
forcement authority, it may be that private enforcement is the method
32. Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evi-
dence and Potential Implications 27 (Harv. Univ. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion
Paper No. 521, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=839250.
33. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006).
34. SEC, FISCAL 2006: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST (2005), available at http://www
.sec.gov/about/secfy06budgetreq.pdf.
35. Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law?: The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
184, 198 (1987).
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best suited for after-the-fact regulation. Professor Richard Marcus
also makes the point that private enforcement-not to be confused
with the absence of regulation-is a natural outgrowth of a certain
kind of regulatory regime:
[T]he American tendency to litigate about topics that are handled
without litigation in other societies is not pathological, but rather a
logical consequence of the American method of providing activist
government without a centralized bureaucracy. On the positive
side, it can provide remarkable protections on the initiative of a few,
including the dispossessed; those who champion the remedial poten-
tial of adversary legalism are right.36
Even at the purely descriptive level, private enforcement is so central
to our system of ex post accountability that the idea that a sufficient
level of state or federal regulation could effectively displace private
litigation is almost inconceivable. Thus, it reads as some combination
of puffery and the bizarre to have the little-known United States Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission proclaim its leading role in ensur-
ing product safety in this country:
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with
protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or
death from more than 15,000 types of consumer products under the
agency's jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries and property damage from
consumer product incidents cost the nation more than $700 billion
annually.... The CPSC's work to ensure the safety of consumer
products-such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and
household chemicals-contributed significantly to the 30 percent
decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer
products over the past 30 years.37
Such claims from a relatively obscure federal agency would likely
come as a shock not only to the affected industries, who clamor cease-
lessly for tort reform and not for freedom from regulatory overreach-
ing, but to any foreign observer asked about the distinctive features of
American products liability law.38
36. Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 907 (2002).
37. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC Overview, http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about
.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2007); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal
Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007) (describing the
growing efforts of regulatory agencies to proclaim preemptive authority through the use of such
statements in regulatory preambles that are not even subject to the notice-and-comment require-
ments of the Administrative Procedure Act). My thanks to Cathy Sharkey for pointing out this
seemingly exaggerated claim by an unheralded agency.
38. Invariably, the perception is that in the United States "the creation of standards is still
largely a private procedure." Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability
and Product Safety-Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through
a Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 308 (2000).
REGULATING AFTER THE FACT
In previous work, I have suggested why, in the context of consumer
claims, exclusive reliance on ex post governmental enforcement ac-
tions is undesirable. 39 The same argument can be extended to broad
swaths of our legal system, whether in the securities markets, con-
sumer protection, or products liability. Across these domains, govern-
mental enforcement actions are typically hampered by a lack of
resources, a confined jurisdictional authority that may not correspond
to the sweep of market-wide harms, a lack of access to local sources of
information about perceived harms, the distance of governmental cen-
ters from where harms occur, and the political dependence or the risk
of political capture of government regulators by politically savvy regu-
lated entities. The basic argument is that decentralized enforcement
combining public vigilance with the eagerness of entrepreneurially
motivated private actors best protects the public interest.
The arguments in favor of decentralized, ex post regulation tie into
a highly contested account of the superiority of the common law to
the more rigid code-based civil law in permitting the flexibility that
liberal market societies require. The chief advocate on this side of the
debate is Friedrich Hayek, who famously argued that "the ideal of
individual liberty seems to have flourished chiefly among people
where, at least for long periods, judge-made law predominated. '40
For Hayek, who believed that individual liberty was the best engine of
economic growth, this meant that there was a strong link between a
common-law court system and the absence of onerous overregulation,
an absence that would help the marketplace flourish. Professor Paul
Mahoney summarized Hayek's comparative claim as follows:
[T]he English legal tradition (the common law) is superior to the
French (the civil law), not because of substantive differences in legal
rules, but because of differing assumptions about the roles of the
individual and the state. In general, Hayek believed that the com-
mon law was associated with fewer government restrictions on eco-
nomic and other liberties. 41
In testing Hayek's claim on a sample of 102 countries over a thirty-
two-year period, Mahoney concluded that "the common-law countries
grew, on average, 0.71 percent per year faster than the civil-law coun-
tries. '42 In common-law countries, "[j]udges are invested with greater
prestige and insulated more from political influence," which results in
39. Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experi-
ence, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135 (1999).
40. F.A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 94 (1973).
41. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 503, 504 (2001).
42. Id. at 514-16.
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"stricter protection for property and contract rights against govern-
ment action. '43
I am less interested in making a normative claim for why private
enforcementis important than the simple positive claim that it is. Not
only is ex ante regulation by the FDA a decided outlier in American
regulatory practice, but even primary reliance on governmental actors
is exceptional outside the criminal context. In fact, many laws which
appear to be ex ante regulations are in fact designed only to ensure ex
post accountability, as with licensing rules that focus heavily on bond-
ing. One quaint example is New York's milk control laws, which re-
quire that milk dealers pay monthly funds into a bond so that
subsequent claims by milk producers may be guaranteed as payable. 44
If the milk commissioner believes a milk dealer is at fault, the commis-
sioner "may authorize the comptroller to pay any such producer up to
seventy-five percent of such estimate"45 from the milk dealer's bond.
Ensuring ex post accountability through ex ante regulation is not
limited to dairy disputes. California requires anyone "who has charge
of, handles or has access to any state property to file an official bond"
so that accountability is secured in the event of damage to state prop-
erty.46 Additionally, vendors who contract with the California govern-
ment to provide health equipment are subject to a bonding
requirement that ensures accountability should the equipment prove
faulty or should they not deliver in good faith.47 All of these regula-
tions, which operate ex ante only in a formalist sense, are in practice
nothing more than minimal entry barriers that ensure ex post account-
ability if harms occur.
IV. THE THREATENED RULE OF LAW
In conversations with representatives of large multinational firms, it
is commonplace to hear complaints about the excesses of the Ameri-
can legal system. Their complaints invariably focus on the high costs
of litigation in the United States. Large international companies claim
that, despite operating around the world, their ventures in the United
States routinely command more than half of their annual litigation
budget. These concerns are undoubtedly real; they resonate with a
central vulnerability of a system in which the power of enforcement is
43. Id. at 523.
44. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 258-b(3)-(6) (McKinney 2004).
45. Id. § 258-b(5). A basically identical requirement can be found in California. CAL. FOOD
& AGRIC. CODE § 61408 (West 1997).
46. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 14625 (West 1992).
47. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14100.75 (West 2001).
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largely turned over to self-interested actors. Moreover, the claims of
excess correspond to the general chorus assailing the cost of the tort
system in the United States. One need look no further than the
weblogs of Overlawyered.com to hear stories of the abuses carried out
in the name of law-some apocryphal, but some unfortunately all too
real. 48
Flip the inquiry, however, and another picture emerges. Ask about
the ease of bringing a product to market, or of engaging in a complex
financial transaction, and it is as if we were discussing a different
world. Now, all of a sudden, the talk is of bureaucratic delay, corrup-
tion, and the high cost of regulatory compliance abroad. The United
States then emerges not as a vexatious and difficult place to do busi-
ness, but as a robust economy generating both opportunity and
wealth.
Both of these pictures are accurate. They are misleading only when
viewed in isolation from each other. Ex post accountability is the pre-
requisite for ex ante liberalization. Without ex post mechanisms, the
American experiment in deregulation becomes a free-wheeling de-
scent into nonregulation. In some markets, particularly those that are
close-knit and have a great deal of repeat play among the participants,
reputation and other informal mechanisms may be sufficient to police
improper conduct. But in our increasingly global economy, with buy-
ers and sellers interchangeable and unknown to each other, it is un-
likely that a developed market society would simply abandon any
form of oversight of the marketplace.
This brings me to my concern about the future of the rule of law in
America. The country is awash in efforts to restrict the mechanisms
of ex post accountability. Although generically falling under the ru-
bric of "tort reform," many of the proposed alterations of the Ameri-
can legal system are simply efforts to eliminate wholesale the
availability of redress for harms suffered in the marketplace. Some-
times these reforms take the shape of prohibitions on getting to court
at all, as with some compelled arbitration rules that effectively fore-
close any prospect of enforcing legal rights.49 Other times, the pro-
posed reforms change the jurisdictional rules of courts or create caps
48. Overlawyered.com, http://www.overlawyered.com/2002/12/about this-site.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 2, 2007) ("Overlawyered.com explores an American legal system that too often turns
litigation into a weapon against guilty and innocent alike, erodes individual responsibility, re-
wards sharp practice, enriches its participants at the public's expense, and resists even modest
efforts at reform and accountability.").
49. 1 have elsewhere addressed the particular use of compelled individual arbitration as a
means of preventing cardholder class actions in the credit card context. Samuel Issacharoff &
Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (2006).
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on remedies. Indeed, many of these may be necessary correctives to
real defects in our legal system.
Sophisticated critiques of ex post regulation are by no means left to
the realm of overheated claims for tort reform. The same pathologies
that infect ex ante regulation 5° can consume ex post regulation as well,
as when awards are unpredictable or when rival sets of tort standards
between different states impede rational economic planning. All reg-
ulatory systems have their vulnerabilities, and a weak point of ex post
accountability is the uncertainty that may accompany the existence of
multiple agents of enforcement. As with current debates over the
scope of FDA preemption of state common-law claims,51 the question
is whether the aims of regulation are better served by centralized ex
ante regulation or ex post common-law claims.
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that this is not the current tort re-
form agenda. The trend does not repair so much as it assaults the civil
justice system. The list starts to look like an institutional anti-account-
ability hit parade. Recent federal legislation, both proposed and en-
acted, presents a telling array, with examples such as the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005,52 the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995,S3 the Attorneys' Anti-enrichment Act of 1998,54 the Loser Pays
Act,55 the Frivolous Lawsuit Reduction Act,56 the Common Sense
Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 2001, 57 and the Medical Malprac-
tice and Insurance Reform Act of 2005.58 Similar tort reform propos-
als not only crowd state legislative dockets, but have become a
mainstay of the ballot initiative process. 59
50. Among the most well-known criticisms of the ex ante regulatory regime is John Morrall's
assessment of the cost-benefit ratio for various regulations, claiming that some cost over $72
billion per individual life saved. This chart appears in many works. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 24-27 (1993). Some
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V. CONCLUSION
An effective civil justice system is essential to the rule of law in this
country. It works imperfectly, spasmodically, and at times with mad-
dening imprecision. It is fueled by self-interest .and ,driven by lawyers
eager to stake claims to financial rewards. There are significant varia-
tions in those cases that do go to trial-a small but highly salient
group of cases. 60 There are mistakes made in trial processes, and
judgments may vary significantly among similarly situated claimants.
It is also costly to maintain. We as a society pay not only for the infra-
structure of courthouses and judges and the time and expenses of ju-
ries, but we pay the high transactional costs associated with privately
retained counsel in the adversarial system.
But we would be remiss in not recognizing what we get in exchange.
Our clumsy and imperfect world of ex post accountability protects our
citizens in a remarkably free economic environment, one whose
growth and vitality sustains us well. The question is not whether we
abandon our ex post legal system, but whether we would tolerate the
push for ex ante regulation that would likely be its substitute.
60. For a cautionary note on the romance of trial versus the more quotidian reality of settle-
ment, see Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004).
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